A long time interest in the lab has been the validity of recovered memories of sexual abuse. Although this has been a highly polarized topic with some researchers asserting that recovered memories are largely accurate and others insisting that they are generally false, our research suggests that both possibilities occur with some regularity.


Can discovered memories be the product of suggestion?

Our research on memory suggestibility is consistent suggest that great caution is required for interpreting memories discovered in the context of such practices (Schooler, 1994; Schooler, Bendiksen, & Ambadar, 1997; Schooler & Hyman, 1997; Schooler, 2000; Shobe and Schooler, 2002; Sivers, Schooler, & Freyd, 2001).   We have conducted several studies examining the potential impact of two factors that are likely to be present in therapy contexts: plausibility- increasing the perceptions that an experience is plausible and schematicity- providing additional details about a possible event.  Our studies have found that while providing individuals with base rate information that suggests an experience is common is a particularly effective technique for increasing individuals’ belief that the event happened to them (Hart & Schooler, 2006 ), providing additional schematic details can under some situations also be effective (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, Lam, Ellis,  & Schooler, 2007).

Can discovered memories correspond to actual abuse?

Although deeply cognizant of the risk of fabricated memories of abuse, we also believe that we as a field must be cautious not to prematurely dismiss the possibility that discovered memories of abuse may, at least on occasion, be authentic. Towards this end, Schooler and colleagues have developed a case study approach for investigating situations in which individuals believe they have discovered long forgotten memories of abuse.  This approach is distinguished in two ways: first, we seek independent corroborative evidence for the various claims that are made, and second we consider each case in light of known cognitive mechanisms.  Using this approach we (Schooler, Ambadar, & Bendiksen, 1997, Schooler, Bendiksen, & Ambadar, 1997; Schooler, 2000; Schooler, 2001, Shobe & Schooler, 2002) have gathered corroborative evidence for a number of cases suggesting that memory discovery experiences can, at least sometimes, correspond to actual incidents of sexual abuse.  At the same time however, we have also found evidence that memory distortion processes may play an important role in memory discovery experiences.  For example, in several cases, individuals believed that they had forgotten about the memories at a time in which they had, in fact, discussed them with other people.  It appears that in the context of an emotional recollective experience, individuals may underestimate their prior knowledge about an event.  This hindsight bias, termed the “forgot-it-all-along” effect, may play an important role in some discovered memories of actual abuse.  More generally, it illustrates how discoveries of both fabricated and authentic memories can involve memory distortion processes.


What are the differences between real and suggested memory?

For obvious theoretical as well as practical reasons, it is of great interest to know the properties that distinguish real memories from memories that are the product of suggestion.  Comparisons between the descriptions of such memories reveal a variety of subtle differences.  For example, actual memories tend to include more sensory details (Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986; Schooler, Clark, & Loftus, 1988) whereas suggested memories include greater references to cognitive processes (cf. Johnson & Raye, 1981).  Despite these aggregate differences, our primary discovery has been that real and suggested memories are often indistinguishable.  Untrained judges can only minimally distinguish between them (Schooler et al., 1986), suggested memories are retrieved as quickly and with as much confidence as real memories (Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989), and they are equally likely to be maintained following contradictory information (Loftus, Korf, & Schooler, 1989).

Who is susceptible to misinformation?

The relationship between misinformation effects and individual differences is rather complex (Schooler & Loftus, 1986).  For example, we have found that individuals with either the best or the worst memory abilities are particularly susceptible to misinformation (Schooler & Loftus, 1993).  This seeming contradiction can be understood, however, when we recognize that the incorporation of misinformation into memory requires two opposite memory demands, 1) forgetting the original information, but 2) remembering the suggested information (Schooler, 1998). 

What causes misinformation to be integrated into memory?

One factor that we found to be of particular importance in cementing misinformation into memory is the act of recollection itself (Schooler, Foster, & Loftus, 1988).  Specifically, we find that encouraging the remembering of misinformation reduces access to the original information.

What is the impact of describing eyewitness situations?

The finding that the act of recollection can itself be a source of memory distortion suggests that situations that encourage inaccurate recollections may lead to memory errors.  This reasoning led us (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) to hypothesize that attempting to verbally recall an intrinsically non-verbal memory would encourage inaccurate recollections which would thereby distort memory.  Consistent with this prediction, we found that verbal rehearsal of a previously seen face or color markedly impaired subsequent recognition.  Since the discovery of this source of memory interference, termed “verbal overshadowing”, we have developed an extensive program of research to better understand when and why verbal overshadowing occurs.